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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the past two decades, Tanzania has embarked on a marked liberalization of its trade 
regime.  The Government wants this reform process to continue and sees international integration 
at the global and regional level as a means to achieve higher economic efficiency, productivity 
and international competitiveness.  This study reviews the trade policy situation in Tanzania and 
identifies a number of key issues and challenges for the country.  In particular, the analysis 
describes the state of domestic trade policy, examines regional integration efforts, and identifies 
priorities for the attention of policy makers and international donors. 
Upon  joining  the  East  African  Community  (EAC)  customs  union  in  January  2005, 
Tanzania changed its import regime and adopted the EAC common external tariff.  As a results, 
its listed average import duty rate fell moderately from 13.8 per cent to 12.3 per cent.  The tariff 
regime continues to be escalatory and generates significant domestic market protection and anti-
export bias.  The scale and dispersion of policy-induced transfers distorts production incentives 
and  makes  it  possible  for  a  considerable  number  of  value-subtracting  firms  to  persist.    The 
authorities  should  rebalance  their  trade  incentives  in  order  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the 
economy. 
Export restrictions have been phased out for most products in the late 1990s.  However, 
in 2003 the Government introduced a 15 per cent export tax on raw hides and skins to assist the 
struggling domestic tanning and leather industry by discouraging exports and making a larger 
number of domestically produced hides and skins available for local processing.  Yet, given the 
importance  of  informal  trade  in  hides  and  skins  and  world-wide  experience  with  export 
restrictions, the success of this strategy is highly uncertain.  The Government should critically 
assess the effectiveness of the restrictions with a view to phasing them out. 
Tanzania has reduced its dependence on trade taxes as sources of government revenue 
through the introduction of value-added taxation.  Import duties now account for less than 10 per 
cent of government income compared with more than a third in the mid-1990s.  This development 
represents a major achievement that should be consolidated by further strengthening the domestic 
tax system, and thereby laying the foundation for deeper international integration of the economy. 
Tanzania is committed to the process of regional integration and is pursuing closer ties 
with neighboring African nations.  The country is engaged in two regional trade agreements 
(RTAs),  namely  the  East  African  Community  and  the  Southern  African  Development 
Community, and is considering to re-enter the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 
from which it withdrew in 2000.  However, as regional trade is of only modest importance and 
external tariffs remain high, there is a considerable risk that regional agreements have a net trade-
diverting and welfare-diminishing impact.  In order to reduce this risk, Tanzania should push for 
reductions in the EAC‟s common external tariff and anchor its regional integration efforts firmly 
within a framework of multilateral liberalization, while leveraging cooperation at the regional 
level to tackle regulatory impediments to trade. 
The simultaneous participation in several regional trade agreements and their potentially 
conflicting  liberalization  requirements  and  schedules  poses  a  number  of  challenges  for  trade 
policy makers in Tanzania.  Pertinent questions relate to the consistency of tariff schedules in 
different RTAs and potential conflicts in the application of different trade standards and border 
procedures.  These questions will gain in prominence, as the overlapping RTAs deepen their 
integration.  At some point, Tanzania might be faced with the dilemma of having to choose one 
RTA over the others in order to avoid contradictory requirements.     4 
1.  BACKGROUND 
Over the past two decades, Tanzania has made significant progress in opening up its 
economy to international markets, but still does not fully exploit its potential to benefit from 
trade.  In the mid-1980s, increasing supply shortages and a worsening balance of payments in the 
largely state-controlled economy contributed to triggering a fundamental change in economic and 
trade policy orientation.  The previously pursued “policy of confinement” was abandoned and 
liberalization  efforts  were  initiated.    Restrictions  on  imports  were  gradually  reduced,  foreign 
exchange transactions were freed up, and the structure of tariffs was simplified.  These reforms 
were reinforced and extended in the early 1990s when import bans for luxury goods and licensing 
requirements  for  exports  were  abolished  and  the  private  sector  was  granted  permission  to 
compete  in  the  processing  and  marketing  of  cash  crops.    Moreover,  since  the  late  1990s 
quantitative restrictions and taxes on most exports have been eliminated (World Bank, 2002) and 
progress  has  been  made  in  liberalizing  the  financial,  telecommunications,  and  transportation 
sectors  (Musonda,  Kweka  and  Kabelwa,  2004).    Import  tariffs  were  adjusted  and  gradually 
reduced on several occasions over time, most recently when Tanzania joined the East African 
Community (EAC) customs union in January 2005.   
The  marked  liberalization  of  the  trade  regime  is  reflected  in  indicators  of  market 
openness, such as  tariff rate averages.  Tanzania‟s tariffs have fallen by more than 7 percentage 
points since the late 1990s. While other countries in Eastern and Southern Africa have liberalized 
in parallel, Tanzania‟s import duties have declined clearly below the regional average (Figure 1). 
In February 2003, the Government explicitly laid out its future international integration 
strategy by publishing a comprehensive set of principles and objectives for trade policy making 
(United Republic of Tanzania, 2003).  This National Trade Policy assigns a central role to trade 
as  a  means  to  achieve  higher  efficiency,  productivity  and  international  competitiveness.  
Moreover, export-led growth is identified as being instrumental for economic development and 
poverty eradication.  To reap these benefits, further international integration efforts are envisaged. 
In  particular,  the  National  Trade  Policy  lays  down  five  specific  objectives.    These 
concern: 
i.  improvements in physical infrastructure and information dissemination; 
ii.  establishment of an integrated, diversified and competitive economy; 
iii.  stimulation of value-adding activities on primary export commodities; 
iv.  attraction of investment flows into sectors that have a comparative advantage; and 
v.  attainment of a balanced current account. 
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Figure 1:  Simple tariff averages in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(in per cent) 
Note:  The  membership in the  Common Market of Eastern and Southern  Africa (COMESA), and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) overlaps. 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 
 
The following discussion reviews the trade policy situation in Tanzania in the context of 
these objectives and identifies a number of key issues and challenges for the country.  The focus 
of the study is thereby on how trade taxes and quantitative restrictions affect the goods sector.  
The analysis falls into three parts.  First, the state of domestic trade policy is described, with 
particular emphasis on the structure and economic effects of border policies.  Then, Tanzania‟s 
regional integration efforts are examined, including a preliminary assessment of the impacts of 
the formation of the EAC customs union with Kenya and Uganda.  And finally, some priorities 
for the attention of policy makers and international donors are identified based on the preceding 
analysis. 
 
2.  DOMESTIC TRADE POLICIES 
Tanzania‟s main trading partners are located in Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
East  Asia  (Table 1).    In  2003,  these  three  regions  accounted  for  almost  90 per  cent  of  the 
country‟s exports and two-thirds of all imports.  Trade relationships have intensified in particular 
with  Sub-Saharan  countries  since  the  late  1990s,  even  though  official  statistics  should  be 
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Table 1:  Structure of Tanzania’s Merchandise Trade 
(per cent of gross domestic product) 
  Total Trade  Exports  Imports  Net-Exports 
  1997  2000  2003  1997  2000  2003  1997  2000  2003  1997  2000 2003 
All Goods                         
World  22.2  21.5  33.1  7.5  7.2  11.8  14.7  14.3  21.3  -7.2  -7.1  -9.5 
East Asia & Pacific  4.7  5.2  6.5  1.5  0.7  1.3  3.2  4.5  5.2  -1.7  -3.8  -3.9 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3 
Middle East & North Africa  1.7  0.9  4.1  0.2  0.1  0.3  1.5  0.8  3.8  -1.3  -0.7  -3.4 
North America  1.1  1.2  1.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.9  1.0  1.0  -0.7  -0.8  -0.9 
South Asia  2.4  2.2  2.6  1.2  1.2  0.8  1.2  1.0  1.8  0.1  0.2  -1.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.0  3.7  7.2  1.1  0.9  2.7  2.9  2.8  4.5  -1.8  -1.9  -1.8 
Western Europe  7.3  7.6  10.9  2.8  3.9  6.4  4.5  3.7  4.5  -1.7  0.3  1.9 
Agriculture, and Food, Beverages and Tobacco                   
World  9.5  7.3  8.1  6.6  4.7  5.2  2.9  2.6  2.9  3.6  2.1  2.3 
East Asia & Pacific  2.4  1.9  1.9  1.4  0.6  0.6  1.0  1.3  1.3  0.4  -0.7  -0.7 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.0 
Middle East & North Africa  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.1 
North America  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
South Asia  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1  0.7  0.1  0.1  0.5  1.1  1.0  0.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.4  1.0  1.9  0.8  0.4  1.5  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.2  -0.1  1.1 
Western Europe  2.8  2.5  2.3  2.4  2.2  1.9  0.4  0.3  0.4  2.0  1.9  1.5 
Mining and Basic Metals                         
World  1.0  2.2  6.1  0.0  1.3  5.0  1.0  0.9  1.1  -1.0  0.4  3.9 
East Asia & Pacific  0.1  0.2  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.3  -0.1  -0.2  0.3 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Middle East & North Africa  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
North America  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
South Asia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.4  0.3  0.8  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.5  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1 
Western Europe  0.2  1.4  4.1  0.0  1.2  4.0  0.2  0.2  0.1  -0.2  1.0  3.9 
Industrial Manufacturing                         
World  11.6  12.1  18.9  0.9  1.3  1.6  10.7  10.8  17.3  -9.8  -9.6 -15.7 
East Asia & Pacific  2.1  3.1  3.7  0.1  0.1  0.1  2.0  3.0  3.6  -1.9  -2.9  -3.5 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.1 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  -0.1  0.0  -0.3 
Middle East & North Africa  1.2  0.7  3.7  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.2  0.7  3.6  -1.2  -0.7  -3.6 
North America  0.6  1.0  0.8  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.9  0.8  -0.5  -0.8  -0.8 
South Asia  1.0  1.0  1.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.9  0.9  1.2  -0.9  -0.8  -1.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.2  2.4  4.5  0.3  0.4  0.9  1.9  2.0  3.6  -1.6  -1.7  -2.7 
Western Europe  4.2  3.8  4.3  0.4  0.6  0.4  3.8  3.2  3.9  -3.5  -2.6  -3.4 
Note:  Industrial Manufacturing refers to all manufacturing sectors except Food, Beverages and Tobacco, 
and Basic Metals (ISIC revision 2 codes 31 and 37).  Trade with non-specified countries is included in the 
World-total. 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on UN COMTRADE database accessed through WITS. 
 
The  value  of  imported  goods  has  regularly  exceeded  the  value  of  goods-exports  in 
Tanzania.  In 2003, the merchandise trade deficit amounted to 9.5 per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP).  Imports exceeded exports for all major geographical regions in the world, except   7 
Western Europe.  On a sectoral basis, Tanzania has had a trade surplus for agricultural and 
mining products and related manufactures, but a large deficit for industrial manufactures. 
2.1  Import Policies 
Tanzania is a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its trade 
policy is guided by adherence to WTO rights and obligations.  Tanzania grants at least most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment to its trading partners.  All tariffs are ad valorem, and there are 
no seasonal duties, tariff quotas, or variable levies.  Tanzania has tariff bindings at a rate of 
120 per cent on goods in 755 tariff lines, covering all agricultural goods and some manufactured 
products.    Bound  tariffs  represent  the  maximum  allowable  tariffs  that  WTO  members  have 
scheduled as part of their commitments in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  
Application of import duties above bound rates is not allowed, unless trading partners adversely 
affected by the tariff change are compensated. 
Yet, countries are free to apply import duties that are lower than their bindings, which is 
the case in Tanzania.  The country‟s simple MFN-tariff average across all tariff lines was 13.5 per 
cent in 2004 and the import-weighted average amounted to 8.8 per cent (Table 2).  The applied 
tariff structure is escalatory with four duty bands being employed in 2004, ranging from zero to 
25 per cent.  Capital goods and unprocessed materials could enter the country free of import duty, 
while tariffs of 10, 15, and 25 per cent, respectively, were charged on semi-processed inputs, fully 
processed inputs, and final consumer goods.  Of the 5324 tariff lines, 3550 (or 67 per cent) were 
non-zero, with 2084 (39 per cent) being subject to the highest duty rate of 25 per cent.  While 
duty  exemptions  for imports  by  central  and  local  governments  were  abolished  in July  2002, 
exemptions continued to be granted for projects financed by development partners, charitable 
organizations and entities with statutory exemptions or under bilateral agreements.  Estimates put 
the  value  of  duty  exemptions  in  Tanzania  at  about  9 per  cent  of  potential  customs  revenue 
(Castro, Kraus and de la Rocha, 2004). 
In addition to the MFN-tariffs, Tanzania used to apply suspended duties to imports of 
goods in 128 tariff lines until the end of 2004.  Most of these surcharges were ad valorem levies, 
while  a  few  tariff  lines  were  subject  to  specific  duties.    The  additional  import  taxes  were 
supposed  to protect  domestic  industry  from  unfair competition  until  new legislation  on  anti-
dumping  and  countervailing  duties,  which  was  enacted  in  April  2004,  would  be  fully 
implemented.    The  highest  suspended  duty  rate  amounted  to  40 per  cent,  bringing  the  peak 
applied  tariff  rate  to  65 per  cent  (25 per  cent  MFN-tariff  plus  40 per  cent  suspended  duty).  
Moreover, minimum dutiable values of USD 390 per metric ton applied to imports of sugar. 
Imports from members of the East African Community (EAC) and the South African 
Development Community (SADC) enter the Tanzanian market under preferential conditions.  In 
particular, the tariffs applied to imports from EAC partner countries in 2004 amounted to a fifth 
of the MFN rates, while the tariff preferences applied to imports from SADC vary by country-
group and type of product.  Yet, Tanzania applied suspended duties on EAC imports in 635 tariff 
lines, eroding the offered preferential market access to some extent (Table 2). 
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Table 2:  Key Indicators of Tanzania’s Import Regime 











average    Total  Non-zero 
Situation 2004 :                 
Base tariff-MFN  5324  3550  4  0  25  10.7  13.5  8.8 
- agricultural products  779  672  4  0  25  9.0  20.3  16.0 
- industrial products  4545  2878  4  0  25  10.5  12.3  7.9 
                 
Listed tariff-MFN  5324  3550  10  0  65  11.4  13.8  9.3 
- agricultural products  779  672  6  0  35  9.2  20.8  18.6 
- industrial products  4545  2878  10  0  65  11.3  12.7  8.0 
                 
Base tariff-EAC   5324  3550  4  0  5  2.1  2.7  1.8 
- agricultural products  779  672  4  0  5  1.8  4.1  3.1 
- industrial products  4545  2878  4  0  5  2.1  2.5  1.6 
                 
Listed tariff-EAC   5324  3550  12  0  25  6.7  4.6  3.7 
- agricultural products  779  672  8  0  25  4.1  4.8  8.1 
- industrial products  4545  2878  12  0  25  7.1  4.6  3.2 
                 
Situation 2005 :                 
CET (without sensitive products)  4972  3045  3  0  25  11.0  11.8   
- agricultural products  736  669  3  0  25  8.3  20.6   
- industrial products  4236  2376  3  0  25  10.7  10.3   
                 
CET (with sensitive products)  5028  3098  10  0  105  12.1  12.3   
- agricultural products  767  697  7  0  105  12.2  22.0   
- industrial products  4261  2401  8  0  65  11.2  10.5   
                 
Note:  Listed tariffs are import duty plus suspended duty.  Agricultural products are those in HS 01-24, and industrial ones those in HS 25-99.  Calculations are 
done at the 8-digit HS-level.  Weighted tariffs are based on 2003 import data. 
Source:  World Bank staff based on information from Tanzania‟s National Bureau of Statistics, the Tanzania Revenue Authority, and UNCTAD‟s-TRAINS 
database accessed through WITS.   9 
The  application  of  suspended  duties  and  minimum  dutiable  values  reduced  the 
transparency of the import regime, accentuated the dispersion in the tariff structure, and led to 
more pronounced tariff escalation.  The latter generates high effective rates of protection (ERPs) 
for producers that have access to inputs at low-tariff rates, while being able to shield behind high 
import barriers for their final products.  By taking into account protection on both outputs and 
inputs,  ERPs  provide  a  better  representation  of  tariff-generated  transfers  to  producers  than 
nominal rates of protection (NRPs), which are based on protection of outputs only.  In some 
sectors in Tanzania, ERPs exceed NRPs substantially and reach levels of more than 100 per cent.  
Also, ERPs show a larger variation across sectors than NRPs and range from –16 per cent for 
transport equipment to 216 per cent for chemicals (Table 3). 
 
Table 3:  Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection 
(in per cent) 
Sector   Listed tariff  Ex-post tariff  Listed CET 
  NRP   ERP  NRP   ERP  NRP   ERP 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry  5.9  20.8  5.9  26.3  11.2  34.0 
Food  25.5  32.7  22.7  39.7  22.2  25.8 
Beverages  25.0  48.7  24.3  45.3  25.0  44.8 
Tobacco  5.9  52.1  3.5  36.3  25.0  47.1 
Textiles and Textile Products  20.0  155.1  5.5  74.3  24.3  165.1 
Leather and Leather Products  3.3  67.0  2.8  59.5  12.7  82.3 
Wood and Furniture  15.4  11.7  10.9  5.3  19.6  21.1 
Paper and Publishing  8.7  7.1  4.8  0.7  10.3  12.0 
Chemicals and Chemical Products  24.0  215.8  21.5  215.6  24.1  217.6 
Rubber and Plastics  21.6  54.3  9.9  27.7  23.1  55.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products  24.7  125.8  16.3  87.2  24.8  123.5 
Basic Metals and Fabricated Products  12.4  40.3  7.6  37.2  19.7  73.2 
Machinery  11.7  -3.3  9.8  -7.9  7.2  -25.6 
Transport Equipment  0.3  -22.3  0.2  -15.9  10.4  -9.0 
Note:  Listed tariffs are import duty plus suspended duty.  Ex-post tariffs are average tariffs (i.e. customs 
receipts divided by cif import values). . 
  Source: Maxwell Stamp (2003). 
 
Imports  are  subject  to  the  same  value -added  and  excise  tax  rates  as  domestically 
produced goods.  Indeed, a large share of the excise duty revenues, which are charged at specific 
or ad valorem rates of up to 30 per cent, is derived from goods that are mainly imported, such as 
petroleum and cars.  Also, the collection of value-added taxes is to a significant extent based on 
imports.  In this context, the authorities should pay attention that not only the indirect tax rates 
but also the intensity and yield of tax collection is similar for imported and domestic products.  
Otherwise, the indirect taxes could turn into implicit barriers to trade by raising the costs of 
imports relative to domestically produced goods. 
While the Government views import taxes in part as a means of protecting domestic 
industry from foreign competition, it is unclear whether the distribution and scale of protection 
granted to different industries has been intentional.  Domestic market protection comes at a cost, 
notably to consumers and firms that source their inputs domestically.  Also, tariff protection 
introduces an anti-export bias.  If firms produce for the export market, they do not receive the 
same market price support that producers for the domestic market enjoy.  Tanzania operates 
manufacturing-under-bond and duty drawback systems, which make it possible for exporters to 
be  exempted  from  or  to  claim  back  the  duty  paid  on  inputs  of  exported  products.    These 
arrangements thus neutralize the effects of tariff policy for exporting firms, even though there are   10 
complaints from companies that the duty refunds are delayed by several months or even years.  In 
any case, since Tanzania can not influence world market prices, exporters do not receive the 
significant policy-generated transfers that producers for the domestic market obtain, thus biasing 
producers‟ decisions against selling abroad.  Indeed, the higher the domestic market protection is, 
the stronger the anti-export bias becomes. 
Yet, awareness among officials of the potentially adverse effects of protectionisms seems 
not always sufficient, which could lead to tolerance of costly resource misallocations.  In a recent 
survey of 152 manufacturing enterprises, 24 firms were found to be value-subtracters (Maxwell 
Stamp, 2003).  The value of their tradable production inputs at international prices exceeded the 
trade  value  of  their  final  products.    Because  of  the  distorted  domestic  price  structure,  these 
companies were not necessarily loss-making and could, hence, continue to operate, although they 
were clearly representing a waste of resources for the economy overall.  Results from a follow-up 
enterprise survey confirm the existence of value-subtractors in Tanzania and suggest that these 
highly inefficient firms are particularly prevalent in the milling, furniture, metals, and textiles 
sub-sectors (Table 4).  
One characteristic of Tanzania‟s import policy that increases the risk of allowing value-
subtracters to persevere is that high market price support is granted to manufacturing branches 
with low value-added.  Sectors like chemicals or textiles for which the share of value-added in 
sales  revenue  is  relatively  small  receive  strong  market  protection,  while  high  value-added 
industries, like paper and publishing, machinery, and transport equipment, are not supported to a 
significant extent or even taxed through high tariffs on imported inputs (Figure 2).  This structure 
of  protection  supports  the  survival  of  firms  that  are  internationally  uncompetitive  and  that 
generate little income to pay wages and income taxes, while imposing significant costs on the 
economy through high output prices.  In this context, a rebalancing of trade incentives appears 
desirable with a view to initiating an efficiency-enhancing restructuring process in low value-
added  manufacturing  branches  and  thus  reducing  the  risk  of  policy-induced  resource 
misallocations. 
 
Figure 2:  Effective Rates of Protection and Value-added in Manufacturing, 2002 
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Trendline  11 
 
Table 4:  Effective Rates of Protection for Selected Sub-Sectors  
(in per cent) 
Sub-sector  Listed tariff  Ex-post tariff  Listed Common 
External Tariff    MFN  EAC  MFN  EAC 
Cotton  -22.0  -6.3  -22.0  -6.3  10.8 
Dairy  187.2  37.2  192.4  51.0  11.8 
Fish  30.0  3.7  30.8  5.9  31.3 
Milling  -VAw  -VAp  -VAw  -VAp  -VAw 
Milling *  31.0  6.0  25.6  6.2  -3.7 
Oils  -27.1  4.2  -33.0  -1.8  25.4 
Tea/coffee  55.6  5.6  47.4  5.1  28.6 
Tea/coffee  53.4  5.5  45.5  5.0  27.8 
Alcoholic drink  48.4  38.6  46.6  37.6  33.2 
Soft drinks  122.2  -4.3  147.9  -19.2  134.3 
Soft drinks *  35.5  -4.2  37.3  -19.1  38.0 
Paints & inks  49.9  5.6  34.2  5.6  26.4 
Soaps & detergents  34.4  46.9  35.3  34.4  47.7 
Other chemicals  10.7  2.2  10.6  2.1  25.1 
Other chemicals *  10.7  2.2  10.6  2.1  25.1 
Mattresses  28.4  5.6  16.6  3.0  28.4 
Mattresses *  27.6  5.4  16.1  2.9  27.6 
Other furniture  -VAw  -VAp  -VAw  -VAp  -VAw 
Other furniture *  35.9  5.7  15.0  4.4  40.0 
Articles of metal  10.9  4.0  0.8  2.8  11.1 
Articles of metal *  10.9  4.0  0.8  2.8  11.1 
Basic metals  -VAw  -VAp  -VAw  -VAp  -VAw 
Basic metals *  16.7  3.3  7.8  3.2  10.8 
Paper products  18.3  24.0  8.3  9.0  15.6 
Printing & publishing  -1.2  3.0  -4.3  2.5  -8.5 
Printing & publishing *  -1.2  2.9  -4.2  2.5  -8.3 
Stationery  30.3  62.5  8.2  51.4  2.1 
Stationery *  9.9  7.5  6.5  6.2  13.5 
Textile articles  -VAw  -VAp  -VAw  -VAp  -VAw 
Textile articles *  10.3  2.2  10.4  0.5  18.1 
Yarns & fabrics  47.9  13.7  21.3  -5.4  14.1 
Yarns & fabrics *  46.1  13.2  20.5  -5.2  13.6 
Articles of wood  48.8  8.2  46.4  7.7  43.8 
Articles of wood *  36.6  6.8  24.8  6.3  27.2 
Basic timber  18.5  3.6  5.0  2.9  7.5 
Basic timber *  16.4  3.2  4.6  2.5  6.9 
Joinery  37.5  7.7  -5.1  7.6  43.3 
Notes :  1) "*" means that enterprises with negative value added (at world or EAC prices) have been excluded.  
2) "-VAw" means that sector value added is negative at world prices.  3) "-VAp" means that sector value added 
is negative at EAC prices.  4) "Tariff Protection" includes the excises and VAT payable upon import duties, but 
not on the values of the goods.  5)  Listed tariffs are import duty plus suspended duty.   6)  Ex-post tariffs are 
average tariffs (i.e. customs receipts divided by cif import values).  
Source:  Rajhi and Webster (2004).   12 
The sectors producing textiles and leather, and machinery and equipment display the 
strongest export orientation in terms of the share of domestic output that is sold abroad (Table 5).  
Given the high effective rates of protection for textiles and the resulting anti-export bias, the 
prominence of textiles exports might seem surprising, but a large share of these exports is sold in 
industrialized country markets under preferential access conditions.  Moreover, exports are very 
volatile  over  time,  so  that  the  export  to  output  ratios  and  export  growth  rates  for  particular 
manufacturing  branches  can  change  significantly  from  one  year  to  the  next.    The  indicators 
should, hence, be treated with care.  Concerning import substitution, the sectors for non-metallic 
minerals, and food, beverages and tobacco have the largest domestic market shares, although 
import growth of non-metallic mineral has been strong since the late 1990s.   
 
Table 5:  Indicators of Trade Performance in the Manufacturing Sector 
(in per cent) 
  Ratio of imports  
to apparent 
consumption, 2002 




growth of imports, 
1997-03 
Average annual 
growth of exports, 
1997-03 
Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco  32  13  0.8  3.0 
Textiles and 
Leather   52  21  9.0  11.3 
Wood and 
Furniture  40  9  12.9  -1.7 
Paper and 
Publishing  40  1  6.4  11.3 
Chemicals, Rubber 
& Plastic   72  11  27.2  40.1 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals  24  10  14.2  5.9 
Machinery and 
Equipment  98  19  7.9  16.9 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on National Bureau of Statistics (2003) and UN COMTRADE database 
accessed through WITS. 
 
Tanzania changed its structure of domestic market protection when joining the customs 
union with Kenya and Uganda in January 2005.  Tariff rates were adjusted to the level of the 
common external tariff, suspended duties and minimum dutiable values were discontinued or 
replaced by special tariffs on “sensitive products”, while intra-regional trade barriers will be 
phased out.  In particular, the arrangement calls for Kenya to eliminate all tariffs on imports from 
Uganda and Tanzania, and for Uganda and Tanzania to eliminate tariffs on each other‟s imports.  
Regarding imports from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania will eliminate tariffs on all imports except 
for an agreed on list of products for which the tariff will be gradually reduced to zero over a 
period of up to five years.  Tanzania‟s list contains 859 products, which are deemed sensitive due 
to their importance for tariff revenues or industrial development.  The asymmetry in liberalizing 
intra-regional trade is intended to give Tanzania and Uganda, which are less developed and have 
a large trade deficit with Kenya, additional time to initiate structural adjustments (Bheenick, 
2003).  Small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, are very concerned about competition 
from more established Kenyan producers and fear to be squeezed out of the common market by 
cheaper imports (Confederation of Tanzania Industries, 2004).   13 
The agreed common external tariff has an escalatory three-band structure, with a zero rate 
for raw materials, capital goods, and meritorious goods, such as medical, pharmaceutical and 
educational supplies; a 10 per cent rate for intermediate goods, and a 25 per cent maximum rate 
for finished goods.  The customs union protocol provides for a revision of the top rate five years 
after the customs union entered into force, and it is expected that the top rate will at that point be 
reduced to 20 per cent.  Almost 40 per cent of all tariff lines are subject to the maximum rate 
(Table 6). 
 
Table 6:  The EAC Common External Tariff 
Category    Number of tariff lines  Ad valorem tariff (per cent) 
Items in zero band    1927  0 
- of which:   Meritorious goods  105  0 
  Raw materials   1111  0 
  Capital Goods  711  0 
Intermediate goods    1159  10 
Finished goods    1886  25 
Source:  World Bank Staff. 
 
In the negotiations on the formation of the customs union, the three EAC partners agreed 
on a list of 56 sensitive  products  to  which  “special  tariffs”  apply.    For  about  a  third  of  the 
sensitive products, the special tariff rates are the same across the three countries, while for the 
other  two-thirds  different duty  levels  apply,  representing  a  departure from  the  principle  of  a 
common external tariff.  In Tanzania, special tariffs range from zero to 105 per cent, with the top 
rate applying to imports of sugar, which was up to the end of 2004 subject to minimum dutiable 
values. 
As a result of the adoption of the common external tariff, the listed average duty rate fell 
from 13.8 per cent to 12.3 per cent.  This reduction is due to lower industrial tariffs, while duties 
on  agricultural  imports  actually  increased  on  average.    The  tariff  changes  are  modest  in 
magnitude for most products and sectors, but estimates of ERPs under the customs union regime 
indicate that the dispersion of protection levels increased (Table 3), further augmenting the risk of 
resource misallocation. 
 
2.2  Export Policies 
Possible misdirection of resources could also become an issue with some measures that 
are applied to exports.  By 1998, trade liberalization had resulted in the removal of requirements 
for export registration, licensing, and surrender of proceeds, as well as the elimination of most 
commodity export taxes.  However, some non-governmental crop boards, such as the Cotton 
Development  Fund  and  the  Cashew  Nuts  Development  Fund,  continue  to  levy  fees  on  their 
members‟ exports to finance research, extension services, and training (Baffes, 2004; Mitchell, 
2004).  Exporters of cotton and raw cashew nuts are required to pay a 3 per cent export charge, 
while processed cashews are subject to a 1 per cent levy. 
Similarly, the Fisheries Department collects royalties on fish exports.  Rates are set at 
what is estimated to be 6 per cent of fob-value, but charged per kilogram rather than on an ad 
valorem basis in an attempt to reduce evasion through underinvoicing (Wilson, 2004).  The duty 
revenues are used by the Fisheries Department to foster development in the sector.   14 
Moreover, in 2003 the government introduced an export tax of 15 per cent on raw hides 
and skins, and established a Livestock Development Fund to administer the revenues from the 
duty.  The principal aim of the measure is to assist the struggling domestic tanning and leather 
industry  by  discouraging  exports  of  raw  hides  and  skins  and  making  a  larger  number  of 
domestically produced hides and skins available for local processing.  However, the success of 
this strategy is uncertain.  A study on Tanzania‟s leather and footwear sectors found that one of 
the main reasons for the insufficient capacity utilization of domestic processing facilities was the 
poor quality of locally produced hides and skins (Kiruthu, 1999).  More than half of total supply 
was considered to be unsuitable for processing.  This deficiency is related to inadequate animal 
husbandry  practices,  prevalent  livestock  diseases,  inappropriate  slaughtering  facilities,  poor 
slaughtering practices, and deficient preservation techniques.  Depressing the domestic price level 
through  the  imposition  of  export  taxes  will  further  reduce  the  value  that  farmers  and 
slaughterhouse operators attribute to hides and skins and, hence, their incentives to produce high-
quality raw materials for the tanning and leather industries. 
Also, it is unclear to what extent the export taxes will succeed in discouraging exports of 
raw hides and skins rather than just enticing producers to trade informally.  Tanzania has long 
land-borders that traders and their livestock can relatively easily cross.  Indeed, the value of 
informal trade between Tanzania and its neighbors is significant (World Food Programme, 2004) 
and according to some estimates even exceeds the value of formal transactions (Ackello-Ogutu 
and Echessah, 1998).  One indication that a large part of the trade in raw hides and skins might 
indeed have turned informal is that revenues from the export tax during July to December 2003 
have amounted to less than 40 per cent of the government‟s target (Mramba, 2004). 
Informal trade had also been undermining quantitative restrictions on trade in tea.  Until 
March 2004, Tanzania operated a “special trading arrangement” for tea that involved an export 
ban on green leaf tea and import bans on black and packed tea in order to support the domestic 
blending and packing industry.  Yet despite the bans, “illegal” trade with neighboring countries 
was estimated to reach a magnitude corresponding to about a third of the domestically consumed 
tea (Baffes, 2003). 
Local  taxes  constitute  another,  although  unintentional,  policy  impediment  to  exports 
(Booth and Kweka, 2004).  Despite a directive form the Prime Minister‟s Office that district taxes 
should not exceed 5 per cent of the goods value, local authorities continue to levy charges at 
points of transit as well as original sale.  For producers that are distant from export locations, the 
cumulative burden of the local taxes can be considerable and will, in combination with the high 
transport costs due to the poor state of freight infrastructure, tend to discourage export operations. 
In general, export restrictions introduce costly distortions into the domestic economy and 
do  most  often  fail  to  achieve  their  industrial  development  objectives.    Similar  to  import 
restrictions, export bans and taxes encourage inefficient production and consumption patterns and 
an suboptimal resource allocation (Piermartini, 2004).  Moreover, there are frequently adverse 
distributional impacts.  If the export restrictions concern primary commodities, as in Tanzania, it 
is often poor smallholders that have to bear the bulk of the economic costs as prices for their 
produce are depressed. 
 
2.3  Revenues from Trade Taxes 
The  government‟s  dependence  on  trade  taxes  as  sources  of  revenue  has  declined 
significantly over time  Before the introduction of value-added taxation in 1997, import duties 
used to account for more than a third of government revenues (41 per cent in 1995/96 and 34 per 
cent in 1996/97).  In the financial year 2003/04, taxes on imported goods still accounted for   15 
almost 40 per cent of the total tax revenue collected by the government (Figure 3), but the bulk of 
these import-related revenues came from non-discriminatory value-added and excise taxes, while 
the share of tariff revenues in total receipts amounted to less than 10 per cent.    The ratio of duty 
revenues to total governmental receipts has thereby become one of the lowest among Eastern and 
Southern African countries (Khandelwal, 2004) 
 
Figure 3:  Share of Trade Taxes in Government Revenue, 2003/2004 
Source:  Ministry of Finance. 
 
Comparing government revenues from import duties with the value of imports makes it 
possible to determine the ex-post average tariff rate, which takes into account the reduced duties 
on imports under preferential agreements, duty exemptions, and “leakage” due to weak customs 
control.  If the average of the import duty revenues for 2002/03 and 2003/04 is related to the 
value of imports in 2003, the ex-post average tariff rate comes to 5.5 per cent.  The corresponding 
average total ex-post burden of trade taxes on imports, including value-added and excise taxes, 
amounted to 23.3 per cent. 
The formation of the customs union with Kenya and Uganda with the adoption of the 
common external tariff, the phase-out of intra-EAC tariffs and the abolishment of suspended 
duties will have an impact of fiscal revenues.  The government expects that the overall effect will 
be positive and that additional revenues of TZS 1 138 million (USD 1.1 million, or 0.8 per cent of 
import duty revenues in 2003/04) will be generated during the fiscal year 2004/05 (Mramba, 
2004).  Other studies project modest revenue losses of 4.2 per cent of import duty revenues in 
Tanzania, with most of the revenue shortfalls being associated with imports of machinery and 
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The implications for tariff revenues and the potential need to establish a compensation 
fund to stabilize government income in partner countries have been discussed extensively in the 
run-up to the formation of the customs union.  Related concerns were particularly prominent in 
the  public  debate  in  Tanzania  and  Uganda.    However,  analysis  of  the  likely  impact  of  the 
implementation of the customs union showed that the short-term revenue losses were relatively 
evenly  spread  across  partner  countries,  eliminating  the  need  for  a  compensatory  mechanism 
(Busse and Shams, 2003). 
In case revenue losses occur, the fiscal shortfalls would best be addressed by improving 
customs administration, border controls, and transit arrangements in order to reduce “unofficial 
exemptions”  and  smuggling.    If  these  measures  are  not  sufficient,  revenues  from  non-
discriminatory  excise  taxes  levied  at  equal  rates  on  imports  and  domestic  products  and 
improvements in the yield of existing value-added taxes should be used to replace the forgone 
tariff revenues.  A restructuring of the indirect tax system is, in any case, desirable, as deeper 
integration into the world trading system will tend to further reduce tariff revenues over time. 
 
3.  REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Tanzania is committed to the process of regional integration and is pursuing closer ties 
with neighboring African nations.  The country is engaged in two regional trade agreements 
(RTAs), namely the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development 
Community  (SADC),  and  is  considering  to  re-enter  the  Common  Market  for  Eastern  and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), from which it withdrew in 2000.  Moreover, Tanzania participates 
in the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum, and has a considerable number of bilateral trade 
agreements, even though the latter are not always thoroughly implemented (Kweka and Leyaro, 
2004). 
While the regional integration efforts are intended to harmonize economic policy and 
promote  trade,  their  underlying  motivation  seems  to  have  been  mostly  political  rather  than 
economic.  SADC, in particular, has for a long time had a development approach to regional 
integration, stemming from the economic independence desires and political security needs of the 
Front Line States (Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira, 2002).  Similarly, the EAC has an agenda 
that spans far beyond trade and economic integration.  Yet, given the low per capita incomes in 
Tanzania and the country‟s development needs, the economic impacts of the regional initiatives 
deserve the greatest attention of policy makers and international donors. 
 
3.1  History of Regional Integration 
East Africa has a long history of regional integration.  Kenya and Uganda first formed a 
customs union in 1917, which the then Tanganyika joined in 1927.  Subsequently, the three 
countries had close economic relationships in the East African High Commission (1948-1961), 
the  East  African  Common  Services  Organisation  (1961-1967),  the  East  African  Community 
(1967-1977), and the East African Co-operation (1993-1999).  In November 1999, the Treaty for 
the establishment of the (new) East African Community was signed, and entered into force in July 
2000. 
In the EAC-Treaty, the partner countries had stated their intention to form a customs 
union by 2004, but the integration process was delayed and the EAC Trade Protocol was not 
signed before March 2004.  After subsequent ratification in national Parliaments, the customs 
union was finally launched in January 2005, establishing a common external tariffs and removing 
all intra-regional trade barriers during a five-year transition period.  Once the customs union is   17 
completed, the EAC partners envisage further integration steps with the creation of a common 
market, a monetary union, and ultimately a political federation, although no time table has been 
established yet. 
Tanzania is also an active member in SADC, which in 1992 grew out of the Southern 
African Development Co-ordination Conference.  SADC‟s Trade Protocol, which was signed in 
1996 and came into effect in October 2000, aims to remove intra-regional trade barriers and turn 
the Community into a free trade area for 85 per cent of goods by 2008, and for all goods by 2012.  
Tariff reductions are asymmetrical, with domestic market protection vis-à-vis South Africa (and 
indirectly the entire Southern African Customs Union area) staying in place for longer than vis-à-
vis other SADC countries (Figure 4).  Plans for the formation of a customs union and a common 
market have been under discussion. 
 
Figure 4:  Tanzania’s Tariff Liberalization Commitments in SADC 
(weighted average tariffs, in per cent) 
 
 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on Mushiri (2002). 
 
Moreover, Tanzania used to be a member of COMESA, which had been founded in 1994.  
One of the main objectives of this regional initiative was to establish a free trade area, which was 
(partly)  achieved  in  October  2000,  when  nine  of  COMESA‟s  members  removed  their  intra-
regional trade barriers.  A further integration step in the form of the establishment of a customs 
union,  which  had  been  planned  for  2004,  has  been  postponed,  as  the  final  structure  of  the 
common external tariff has yet to be agreed upon. 
Tanzania is no longer a member of COMESA after leaving the Agreement in 2000.  The 
withdrawal  decision  was  based  on  an  assessment  that  multiple  RTA-membership  was  too 
resource-consuming and that Tanzania's regional integration interests were better served by its 
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COMESA tariff liberalization are also believed to have contributed to the decision (WTO, 2000).  
Yet, Tanzania continues to be influenced by trade policy developments in COMESA, not least 
because  Kenya  and  Uganda,  Tanzania‟s  two  partners  in  the  EAC  customs  union,  are  both 
members of COMESA. 
 
3.2  Importance of Regional Trade 
Tanzania‟s trade relationships with other countries in the region have intensified in recent 
years, both in terms of the volume of trade and the scope of traded goods (Kweka and Mboya, 
2004).  However, according to official statistics, regional trade remains only of modest overall 
importance for the country.  The eight countries with which Tanzania has land-borders have a 
combined population and gross domestic product that is five and four times, respectively, the size 
of Tanzania‟s.  Yet, in 2003 these neighbors absorbed less than 14 per cent of Tanzanian exports 
and were the origin of less than eight per cent of the country‟s imports.  The value of trade with 
all African countries accounts for less than a quarter of Tanzania‟s total exports and imports 
(Table 7).  It should be noted, though, that these figures do not reflect underreported or informal 
trade. 
Tanzania‟s most important regional export markets in 2003 were Kenya, Uganda, and 
South Africa, and the regional trading partners with the largest import share in the Tanzanian 
market were South Africa, Kenya, and Swaziland.  More than 90 per cent of Tanzania‟s regional 
trade was undertaken with members of EAC or SADC, that is under terms of preferential market 
access.  Tanzania lost preferential access to Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Rwanda, and Sudan when it left COMESA in 2000.   
The Tanzanian authorities tried to negotiate bilateral agreements with the countries that 
are members of COMESA but not SADC in order to maintain the tariff preferences that had been 
achieved through earlier liberalization steps within COMESA.  This attempt did succeed only 
with Tanzania‟s EAC partners, Kenya and Uganda, with whom the achieved preference margins 
were frozen.  Preferential trade relations with the other COMESA-but-not-SADC members were 
discontinued.  While trade with the “COMESA only” group of countries accounts for less than 
two per cent of Tanzania‟s total exports and imports (Table 7), Tanzania has consistently had a 
merchandise trade surplus with the group since 1997.  Also, a relatively large share of the trade 
with “COMESA only” is in industrial goods, which motivates interest of industrial producers in 
Tanzania  in  re-entering  COMESA  and  obtaining  better  access  to  “COMESA  only”  markets 
(Matambalya, 2004). 
EAC  and  SADC  accounted  in  2003  both  for  about  ten  per  cent  of  Tanzania‟s  total 
exports, with EAC trade being focused on agri-food products, while exports to SADC members 
consisted mainly of mining and industrial products.  On the import side, SADC was almost three 
times as important as EAC as a source of goods.  As a result, Tanzania had a sizable trade deficit 
with SADC, while for the first time in many years it boosted a surplus vis-à-vis its EAC partners.   19 
 
Table 7:  Structure of Tanzania’s Merchandise Trade within the Region 
(per cent of gross domestic product) 
    Total trade  Exports  Imports  Net-Exports 
    1997  2000  2003  1997  2000  2003  1997  2000  2003  1997  2000  2003 
All Goods                           
World    22.2  21.5  33.1  7.5  7.2  11.8  14.7  14.3  21.3  -7.2  -7.1  -9.5 
- Africa    4.0  3.7  7.3  1.1  0.9  2.7  2.9  2.8  4.6  -1.8  -1.9  -1.8 
- Members of  EAC  1.7  1.1  2.5  0.4  0.4  1.3  1.3  0.7  1.2  -0.9  -0.3  0.1 
  SADC only  1.5  1.8  3.4  0.1  0.1  0.4  1.4  1.7  3.0  -1.3  -1.6  -2.6 
  SADC & COMESA  0.6  0.5  1.0  0.4  0.2  0.8  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3  -0.1  0.6 
  COMESA only  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1 
- Other Africa   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  -0.0  0.0  0.0 
- Rest of World   18.2  17.8  25.8  6.4  6.3  9.1  11.8  11.5  16.7  -3.6  -3.2  -5.8 
Agriculture, and Food, Beverages and Tobacco                   
World    9.5  7.3  8.1  6.6  4.7  5.2  2.9  2.6  2.9  3.6  2.1  2.3 
- Africa    1.4  1.1  1.9  0.8  0.5  1.5  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.2  -0.1  1.1 
- Members of  EAC  0.5  0.4  1.1  0.3  0.3  1.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.9 
  SADC only  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1 
  SADC & COMESA  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.3  -0.1  0.3 
  COMESA only  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
- Other Africa   0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 
- Rest of World  8.1  6.2  6.2  5.8  4.2  3.7  2.3  2  2.5  2.1  3.2  2.2 
Minerals, and Base Metals                         
World    1.0  2.2  6.1  0.0  1.3  5.0  1.0  0.9  1.1  -1.0  0.4  3.9 
- Africa    0.4  0.3  0.8  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.5  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1 
- Members of  EAC  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.1  0.0 
  SADC only  0.1  0.2  0.6  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.4  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
  SADC & COMESA  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  COMESA only  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
- Other Africa   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
- Rest of World  0.6  1.9  5.3  0  1.2  4.7  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.2  -0.3  0.7 
Industrial Manufacturing *                         
World    11.6  12.1  18.9  0.9  1.3  1.6  10.7  10.8  17.3  -9.8  -9.6  -15.7 
- Africa    2.3  2.4  4.6  0.3  0.4  0.9  2.0  2.0  3.7  -1.7  -1.7  -2.9 
- Members of  EAC  0.9  0.7  1.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.8  0.5  1.0  -0.7  -0.4  -0.7 
  SADC only  0.9  1.3  2.5  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.9  1.3  2.4  -0.9  -1.3  -2.3 
  SADC & COMESA  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3 
  COMESA only  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
- Other Africa   0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
- Rest of World   9.3  9.7  14.3  0.6  0.9  0.7  8.7  8.8  13.6  -6.5  -6.2  -10.0 
Note: EAC trading partners are Kenya and Uganda; “SADC only” refers to Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and 
South Africa; “SADC & COMESA” is the group comprising Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, 
Malawi,  Mauritius,  Seychelles,  Swaziland,  Zambia,  and  Zimbabwe;  and  “COMESA  only”  consists  of  Burundi, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Sudan. 
*) Industrial Manufacturing  refers to all  manufacturing sectors except Food, Beverages and Tobacco, and Basic 
Metals (ISIC rev. 2 codes 31 and 37). 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on UN COMTRADE database accessed through WITS. 
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However, Tanzania‟s trade positions vis-à-vis its two EAC partners differ fundamentally.  
With regard to trade with Uganda, Tanzanian exports during 2003 exceeded the value of imports 
in all goods sectors, except for wood and chemical products (Table 8).  The bilateral trade surplus 
amounted to almost 40 million USD.  With Kenya, on the other hand, Tanzania had a trade deficit 
of almost similar size, as the value of its strong agricultural, fish and textiles exports was more 
than offset through Kenyan exports of industrial products into the Tanzanian market.  In earlier 
years, Tanzania had a larger trade deficit with Kenya, while trade with Uganda was roughly in 
balance. 
 
Table 8:  Structure of Tanzania’s Trade with EAC Partners, 2003 
(„000 USD) 
ISIC-2  Sector    Kenya      Uganda   
Code  Description  Exports  Imports  Balance  Exports  Imports  Balance 
11  Agriculture and Hunting  18081  2719  15361  31599  1418  30181 
12  Forestry and logging  87  3  84  31  0  31 
13  Fishing  44532  8  44524  513  0  513 
21  Coal Mining  2  5  -4  0  0  0 
22  Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas   0  94  -94  0  0  0 
23  Metal Ore Mining  0  1  -1  0  0  0 
29  Other Mining  331  1152  -821  0  0  0 
31  Food, Beverages and Tobacco  4554  7928  -3374  1094  278  815 
32  Textiles and Leather   6575  2014  4561  775  80  695 
33  Wood and Furniture  680  1540  -860  59  65  -6 
34  Paper and Publishing  469  4377  -3908  288  123  165 
35  Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic   3286  62795  -59509  4484  5814  -1330 
36  Non-Metallic Minerals   137  3748  -3611  1024  50  974 
37  Basic Metal Industries  801  8291  -7490  4373  31  4343 
38  Machinery and Equipment  3409  20316  -16907  3819  349  3470 
39-99  Other   421  1320  -899  47  2  44 
0-99  Total  83363  116310  -32948  48104  8210  39895 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on UN COMTRADE database accessed through WITS. 
 
3.3  Economic Effects of Regional Initiatives 
Economic integration at the regional level can make it possible to reap benefits from 
international specialization, while tailoring the provisions of the agreement to the particular needs 
and adjustment capacities of the countries involved.  In the short term, regional integration will 
entail adjustment needs, as prices on the domestic market change in response to tariff reforms.  
Econometric analysis based on firm-level data suggests that the adoption of the EAC‟s common 
external tariff by Tanzania will overall affect profit margins, productivity, wages and employment 
only slightly (Table 9).  The effects are not uniform across sectors, though, as the changes in 
input and output prices differ, with the paper and publishing and metals sectors being subject to 
more marked impacts.  However, these findings should be treated with care, as the estimates are 
not always statistically significant.   21 
 
Table 9:  Short-Term Impacts of the Adoption of the Common External Tariff in Tanzania 
(in per cent) 
Sector  Price-Cost Margin  Productivity  Employment  Wages 
Agro-industry  0.31  0.65  -2.78  0.90 
Chemicals and Paints  1.27  7.59  1.46  -0.72 
Construction Materials  0.74  1.59  -0.88  2.87 
Metals  0.33  -3.94  -5.69  4.33 
Paper and Publishing  0.71  -10.49  -9.01  6.40 
Textiles and Leather  -0.21  -1.54  -1.91  0.47 
Note:  Calculations based on listed overall average tariffs. 
Source:  Rajhi and Webster (2004). 
 
In  the  medium  and  longer  term,  there  might  be  more  pronounced  impacts.    If  the 
reduction of intra-regional trade barriers fosters partner countries to expand output and exports of 
products for which they are internationally competitive, the price of final goods or production 
inputs on the importing country market falls to the benefit  of consumers and input-purchasing 
producers.  In this case, additional welfare-enhancing trade is created. 
Moreover,  regional  trade  initiatives  can  have  beneficial  indirect  effects.    Opening 
domestic markets to partner countries, for example, can increase  competition in sectors with 
previously highly concentrated industrial structures and thereby reduce the monopolistic pricing 
power of incumbents.  Such pro-competitive impacts are particularly important for countries like 
Tanzania  that  have  only  a  nascent  domestic  competition  policy,  while  showing  significant 
concentration in some industrial sectors, such as cigarette manufacturing and beer brewing. 
Also,  regional  cooperation  can  be  effective  in  harmonizing  customs  procedures  and 
domestic regulations.  Adopting common rules on investment, for example, has the potential to 
encourage increased inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) by enhancing the credibility of 
FDI-policies and providing a restraint on sudden policy reversals.  However, so far the regional 
integration initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa contain very few investment provisions 
(Te Velde and Fahnbulleh, 2003). 
Some observers justify RTAs in political economy terms by seeing them as laboratories 
for international integration, training  grounds for negotiations at a broader level, and strategic 
means of trade policy making.  By teaming up with regional partners, countries may be able to 
increase the weight of their positions in international trade negotiations and possibly achieve 
more  favorable  negotiation  outcomes.    Also,  regional trade agreements  make  it  possible  for 
countries to gain some control over the trade policy of their partner countries. 
Conversely, engaging in RTAs implies passing parts of a country‟s sovereignty on to the 
regional bloc.  For example, as a result of joining the EAC customs union, Tanzania can no 
longer freely decide on its level of import duties, but depends on consensus with Kenya and 
Uganda to pursue changes to the common external tariff.  Hence, the institutional framework for 
trade  policy  making  changes.    Moreover,  by  concluding  a  customs  union,  countries  may 
implicitly have to abide to international commitments of their trading partners that are more 
stringent than their own.  In the case of the EAC, Kenya  and Uganda have scheduled lower 
WTO-tariff bindings than Tanzania (Table 10).  While these commitments do formally not limit 
Tanzania‟s ability to raise the tariffs it applies towards its own binding level, the country would   22 
not be able to do so without violating the common external tariff, if one of its EAC partners faces 
a binding WTO commitment in the respective tariff lines. 
 
Table 10:  WTO Tariff Bindings of EAC Members 
Country  Number of bound tariff lines  Minimum binding (%)  Maximum binding (%) 
Kenya  748  18  100 
Tanzania  755  120  120 
Uganda  815  40  80 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedules database accessed through WITS. 
 
More importantly, RTAs may result in losses of government revenues, as tariffs on intra-
regional trade are phased out (see section 2.3 above), or promote costly trade diversion rather 
than welfare-enhancing trade creation, if trade is shifted from efficient producers outside the RTA 
to preferential trading partners that produce at higher costs.  In this case, the government loses 
tariff  revenue  on  imports  from  third  countries,  without  domestic  producers  benefiting  to  a 
corresponding  extent  from  lower  import  prices.    The  risk  for  trade  diversion  to  occur  is 
particularly high if MFN tariffs remain high and trade with partner countries accounts for only a 
small share of overall trade (World Bank, 2004), as in Tanzania. 
A recent review of studies on the trade and welfare effects of customs unions concluded 
that the elimination of intra-regional trade barriers between small developing countries is likely to 
generate mostly trade diversion and little trade creation, unless significant reductions in MFN-
tariffs accompany the regional integration efforts (Schiff and Winters, 2003).  In the case of 
Tanzania, the formation of the EAC customs union and the adoption of the common external 
tariff led to modest average tariff reductions, while the top rate of 25 per cent was left unchanged.  
Analysis using a partial equilibrium model that takes into account the response of producers and 
consumers to tariff and price changes following customs union formation suggests that imports 
into Tanzania from EAC partners would grow by 3.1 per cent over 2002-levels following the 
complete phase-out of intra-regional tariffs, while imports from third countries would increase by 
14.5 per cent (Castro, Kraus, and De la Rocha, 2004).  If the top CET rate were to be reduced to 
20 per  cent,  the  study  finds  that  imports  from  third  countries  would  grow  by  16.3 per  cent 
compared to the 2002-baseline, while imports from EAC partners would increase by only 2.4 per 
cent.  These results imply that a lowering of MFN-tariffs would result in a reduction (or slower 
growth compared with the baseline) of intra-regional trade.  Hence, at least some of the new EAC 
trade seems to be merely the consequence of regional tariff preferences rather than comparative 
advantage.  In other words, the EAC customs union is diverting trade away from third countries. 
Another  indication  that  the  EAC  customs  union  might  have  detrimental  impacts  on 
Tanzania is that the country sources very few products exclusively from EAC partners.  Indeed, 
in nearly all tariff lines imports from third countries dominate imports from Kenya and Uganda 
(Castro,  Kraus,  and  De  la  Rocha,  2004).    Hence,  there  is  a  risk  that  the  extension  of  EAC 
preferences leads to a substitution of regional for third country imports instead of creating new 
trade.   
In  general,  the  production  and  trade  structures  of  countries  in  Eastern  and  Southern 
Africa are not particularly complementary (Chauvin and Gaulier, 2002).  Similarities between the 
export basket of one country and the import basket of another can be analyzed by using the 
bilateral product complementarity index (Tsikata, 1999).  The value of this index can range from 
zero, which represents no complementarity between exports and imports of two countries, to one   23 
hundred, which implies a perfect match.  The higher the index between two countries, the greater 
the product complementarity. 
If the bilateral product complementarity index is calculated for 2003 from trade data at 
the two-digit Harmonized System classification level, Tanzania‟s export and Kenya‟s imports 
show an index value of 52.8 and Tanzania‟s imports and Kenya‟s exports a value of 42.0.  The 
corresponding values for Tanzania‟s trade with Uganda are 49.7 and 31.0.  These values for EAC 
partner  complementarity  fall  short  of  those  for  well  established,  successful  regional  trade 
initiatives, such as the European Union (index value of 53.4) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (56.3), but exceed those of failed RTAs, such as the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (22.2) and the Andean Pact (7.4).  In any case, the EAC index values are relatively 
large by regional standards and compare well with bilateral complementarity indices between 
COMESA and SADC partners, which only in a few cases exceed 25 (Khandelwal, 2004).  Yet 
despite the low intra-regional trade intensity and complementarity in Southern Africa, ex-ante 
analysis using a computable general equilibrium model predicts that the formation of the SADC 
free trade area will be net welfare-improving, with Tanzania, however, reaping smaller benefits in 
relation to its GDP than other SADC members (Lewis, Robinson, and Thierfelder, 2003).   
While  further  quantitative  analysis  of  the  economic  effects  of  regional  integration 
initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa seems warranted, the available evidence suggests that 
there is considerable uncertainty about whether the existing regional agreements are in the best 
economic interest of Tanzania and its partner countries in the region.  The authorities should try 
to  maximize  the  benefits  from  Tanzania‟s  RTAs  by  pursuing  deeper  integration  through 
harmonization of trade standards and behind-the-border regulations.  In parallel, the Government 
should follow a paradigm of open regionalisms by continuing to push for lower external trade 
barriers in order to counter the risk of trade diversion.  RTAs should generally be seen as a means 
of  economic  cooperation  that  can  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  the  country‟s  overall 
development strategy, but that can not be a substitute for continuing domestic policy reform and 
multilateral trade liberalization. 
  
3.4  Overlapping Membership in Regional Agreements 
The simultaneous participation in several regional trade agreements poses a number of 
challenges for trade policy makers in Tanzania and in its EAC partners.  As discussed earlier, 
Tanzania is a member of SADC, but not of COMESA, while Kenya and Uganda are members of 
COMESA, but not of SADC.  This asymmetric configuration has the potential to create confusing 
and conflicting situations, which are bound to intensify over time as the respective integration 
agendas of EAC, SADC and COMESA are deepening. 
Multiple membership of overlapping RTAs creates demanding requirements in several 
respects.  In the private sector, traders have to operate within different trade regimes, each with its 
own  tariff  rates,  regulations  and  procedures.    In  the  public  sector,  negotiating  and  serving 
different regional initiatives can absorb large amounts of scarce administrative resources and 
occupy policymakers‟ attention to a considerable extent.  In addition, budgetary contributions 
from member states towards the administration costs of the various RTAs can be a significant 
burden, as indicated by the cumulative (annual) arrears in membership contributions in SADC 
and COMESA (Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira, 2002).  Also, judicial conflicts might arise 
out of the existence of alternative legal frameworks and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
One issue of particular concern are the potentially significant costs that can result from 
the need to comply with multiple rules of origin regulations (Brenton and Imagawa, 2004).  The 
EAC agreed on rules of origin that are generally in line with those used in COMESA, which   24 
specify a local value addition requirement of 35 per cent or a change in tariff heading, but for a 
number of tariff lines more complex, sector and product-specific rules of origin, as in SADC, 
were adopted.  This situation with different rules of origin in EAC, SADC, and COMESA may 
pose problems for firms in EAC members that want to trade with neighboring countries and force 
them to adjust their production or trade operations.  In particular, firms might be compelled to 
focus on only certain export destinations, given that they might need to produce differently in 
order to receive preferential access in foreign markets.  Also, situations at the border may arise 
that are open to abuse or subject to excessive bureaucracy, thereby inflicting costs on traders in 
addition and beyond those related to compliance with the applicable rules of origin regulations 
(Hess, 2004). 
Another  type  of  problem  from  overlapping  RTA-membership  relates  to  conflicting 
liberalization  commitments  and  requirements  in  different  agreements  (Bohanes,  2002).    The 
SADC Trade Protocol (Article XXVIII, paragraph 2) states that member states cannot enter into a 
preferential trade agreement with third countries that may “impede or frustrate the objectives of 
this protocol and that any advantage, concession, privilege or power granted to a third country 
under such agreements is extended to other Member States.”  A similar provision is included in 
Article 56  of  the  COMESA  Treaty.    Since  upon  joining  the  EAC  customs  union,  Tanzania 
granted market access preferences to Kenya and Uganda that exceed those given to its SADC 
partners, the literal reading of the provision implies the requirement to extend the EAC free intra-
regional trade benefits also to all SADC countries.  However, paragraph 3 of the same Article 
grants  countries  an  exception  from  the  obligation  to  extend  preferences  if  the  additional 
concessions are undertaken in the context of an agreement that preceded the Trade Protocol.  As 
the EAC Treaty came into force three months before the SADC Trade Protocol, the waiver could 
apply.   
Indeed, after deliberating on the matter, the EAC Council decided not to extend the EAC 
market access benefits to SADC and COMESA partners.  However, the EAC members were 
allowed to continue with their existing obligations to SADC and COMESA and imports from the 
respective countries were exempted from the EAC‟s common external tariff.  This continuation of 
member-specific preferences within the customs union could result in trade deflection, unless 
border controls are maintained for strict intra-EAC policing of trade, notably verification of rules 
of origin.  Otherwise, Egyptian traders, for example, could export goods duty free to Kenya under 
the COMESA free trade arrangement and the local importers could then ship them to Tanzania 
duty-free under EAC preferences.  Conversely, SADC members could use Tanzania as a transit 
route to Kenya and Uganda.  Similar trade deflection could occur as a result of differences among 
EAC partners in tariff exemptions, providing a strong argument for their harmonization (Castro, 
Kraus, and de la Rocha, 2004).  To counter any unintended extension of preferences, border 
controls  will  need  to  continue.    Indeed,  as  long  as  the  situation  of  overlapping  membership 
remains, the EAC will not be able to become a fully functioning customs union and its members 
will not be able to reap the benefits of free internal movement of goods (Hess, 2004). 
Over the past years, SADC, COMESA and the EAC have been working more closely 
together in areas such as regional trade analysis, capacity building, and transport facilitation.  So 
far the economic integration schedules and the move towards freer intra-regional trade have not 
resulted in any major inconsistencies.  Yet, the formation of the EAC customs union and the 
possibly resulting problems of trade deflection highlight the emerging integration conflicts, as the 
individual trade initiatives deepen their status.  Both COMESA and SADC are also hoping to 
form customs unions in the medium-term future.  Since one country can not realistically apply 
two different common external tariffs, Tanzania and its EAC partners are sooner or later bound to 
face the choice about which agreement they want to go with.   25 
Some analysts have argued that Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda should resign, respectively, 
from  SADC  and  COMESA,  while  retaining  their  political  affiliation  through  an  “Associate 
Membership.”  The status of the latter would grant the right to attend meetings as observers, but 
would be free of tariff obligations and carry reduced membership fees.  The EAC would then 
negotiate  preferential  agreements  covering  all  of  the  partner  countries  within  SADC  and 
COMESA  (Hope,  Bhowon  and  Ruhindi,  2003).    Others  have  suggested  that  the  Cotonou 
Agreement and the Economic Partnership negotiations with the European Union could become 
the external driving force that would push the regional organizations to rationalize and harmonize 
their trade agreements (De la Rocha, 2003; Hinkle and Schiff, 2004).  What seems important, in 
any case, is that policy makers are aware of the possibly emerging conflicts in integration and 
liberalization  schedules  between  different  RTAs  and  ensure  sufficient  flexibility  in  their 
integration commitments to avoid contradictory requirements.   
 
4.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY REFORM AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
Improvements  in  Tanzania‟s  trade  performance  will  depend  on  a  number  of  factors.  
Important supply constraints have to be addressed (Amani, Nyange, Kweka, and Leyaro, 2003), 
including those concerning high transportation costs, inability to produce goods that meet quality 
standards in foreign markets, and high costs of doing business.  Overcoming these impediments 
will require time and a considerable amount of resources.  In contrast, improvements in core trade 
policy can be undertaken relatively quickly and without the need for large-scale financial funds.  
Indeed,  an  effective  trade  policy  can  contribute  to  mobilizing  resources  for  growth  and 
development. 
Tanzania has made considerable progress over the past two decades in liberalizing its 
economy  and  integrating  it  into  the  regional  and  global  market.    The  phasing-out  of  trade 
restrictions  has  played  a  key  role  in  the  revival  of  the  Tanzanian  export  sector  and  the 
rationalization of imports (Kanaan, 2000), even though vested interests, such as those represented 
in the export crop boards, have in some sectors undermined the reform efforts (Cooksey, 2003).  
Moreover, the country was played an active role at the regional level and in the WTO. 
This study described and assessed Tanzania‟s trade policy situation at a critical point in 
time, i.e. just after joining the EAC customs union.  It thereby identified a number of issues that 
need to be addressed in order to make better use of Tanzania‟s trade potential.  A set of policy 
reform priorities and technical assistance needs that emerges from the preceding discussion is 
developed and presented in Table 11.   26 
 
Table 11:  Policy Reform and Technical Assistance Matrix 
Policy issue  Action recommended 
Requirements 
Agency 
















































































Import policy             
  Reduce tariff escalation by pushing for a 
reduction in the top rate within EAC.    X    MIT, MoF  Longer term 
  Establish a time-table for the phase-out of 
special tariffs on “sensitive products”.    X    MIT, MoF  Medium term 
  Reduce reliance on tariff revenue by reducing 
“leakage” and strengthening the tax system.    X    MoF, TRA  Longer term 
  Improve awareness of trade policy issues 
through better communication/internet site.      X  MIT  Short term 
  Strengthen analytical skills of public officials 
for policy reform and trade negotiations.      X  MIT  Medium term 
Export policy             
  Critically assess existing export restrictions 
with a view to phasing them out.    X  X  MIT, MCM  Medium term 
  Finance sector development funds from the 
budget rather than through export levies.    X    MoF, MNRT  Longer term 
  Expedite duty drawback refunds in order to 
reduce anti-export bias.  X      TRA  Short term 
Regional integration           
  Increase professional staff in the EAC 
Secretariat to deal with enhanced tasks.    X    MoF  Medium term 
  Harmonize exemptions within EAC to reduce 
the risk of trade deflection.    X    MIT, TRA  Short term 
  Push for simple, non-restrictive rules of 
origin specifications in regional agreements.    X    MIT  Longer term 
  Aim for flexibility within RTAs in order to 
avoid contradictory requirements.    X    MIT  Longer term 
  Carefully assess the advantages and 
drawbacks of re-entering COMESA.      X  MIT  Medium term 
             
Note:  Agency abbreviations:  MIT – Ministry of Industry and Trade; MoF – Ministry of Finance; TRA – 
Tanzania Revenue Authority; MCM – Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing; MNRT – Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism. 
Time frame specifications:  Short term – within 12 months, Medium term – within 2 years, Longer term – 2 to 
5 years. 
Source:  World Bank Staff. 
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